This paper is part of series of studies focusing on the measurement and definition of institutions. This paper presents a database on institutional measures for Tanzania for the period 1884 to 2008. These indicators are used to assess the nature of political and economic institutional transformation from the colonial legacy to the modern outcome, using Tanzania as a natural experiment. The paper argues that despite changes in colonial regimes, the broader framework of institutions remained partly the same. This is reflected in the post-independence period in Tanzania, where the title of the president was substituting the governor titles in some land laws. Similarly, draconian laws similar to the colonial laws were enacted to curtail political freedom in the post-independence period.
Introduction
This paper evaluates the nature of institutions that characterise Tanzania, in the form of property rights, judiciary systems and political rights for the period 1884 to 2008. This is done through the construction of de jure and de facto indicators of property rights, political freedom and judicial independence, using legislation as an indication of the rules of the game (see North, 1990 ). The indices chosen represent the political and economic institutions considered important for economic growth. The lengthy time period is chosen following the suggestion by Kaufman et al. (2003) that the likelihood of observing significant changes in institutional variables substantially increases with the length of time under consideration.
Crucial to the study, the period under review also allows the examination of the hypothesis of the persistence of inherited institutions. According to Acemoglu et al. (2001) , in areas where Europeans showed strong settlement patterns, they created institutions characterised by strong protection of property rights and efficient enforcement of contracts. They argue that these institutions, created by colonisers, have persisted over time and they continue to influence economic performance after independence. Tanzania, like many other developing countries, finds itself at the heart of these debates. Amongst the German colonies in Africa, Tanzania and Namibia were the only colonies with sizeable German populations, which underscore the presence of European settlement in these countries. According to Acemoglu et al. (2001) , European settlers demanded and received social, political and institutional structures similar to those that existed in their home country.
countries.
The broad aim of this review is to look closely at the measurement of institutions. The main motivation for this interest is that despite the emphasised importance of institutions, measuring of institutions remains a critical question.
Empirical Literature Review

Measures of Political and Economic Institutions
The way that empirical institutional measures are categorised is important for interpreting their effects. The institutional framework, as provided for in the definition by North (1990) , comprises both formal and informal constraints. From this widely cited definition, good institutions are viewed as establishing an incentive structure that reduces uncertainty and promotes efficiency, hence contributing to improved economic performance.
(i) Property Rights Indicators
In the literature, property rights are often argued to have the greatest impact on economic growth. 11 However, the quantification and operationalisation of property rights has proved to be challenging. Nevertheless, this has not stopped researchers from creating indices to measure property rights. The most frequently used indicator of property rights is provided in the compilations of the Economic Freedom Index by the Frazer Institute. According to Gwartney et al. (1996) , an index of economic freedom should measure the extent to which legally acquired property is protected and individuals are engaged in voluntary transactions. This indicator was based initially on objective quantifiable variables in most of its components, in the form of macroeconomic indicators, while omitting key elements of law and regulations affecting economic freedom.
However, this has been corrected in Gwartney and Lawson (1997) and subsequent publication of the data sets for 1997-2000; additional components on legal and regulatory elements have been added to the data sets. Since 2000, the Fraser Institute has been looking at 38 components which are divided into five major components to rate the countries 12 on a scale of zero to ten on an annual basis. A score of ten means a country is the most free, and a score of zero means a country is the least free. Ratings are available for some countries since 1970 (at five-year intervals).
Another database that provided an indicator of property rights protection is the Heritage Foundation (see Johnson et al., 1995) . The degree to which property rights are guaranteed is scored between one (very high) and five (nonexistent). Unlike the Fraser Institute, the property rights index is reported as a separate score and it is available annually since 1996.
A longer time run of property rights is provided by Fedderke et al. (2001) for South Africa dating back as far as 1950 and spanning up to 1997, while recently Gwenhamo et al. (2008) provided a similar index for Zimbabwe, Zaaruka et al. (2010) for Namibia, Fedderke et al. (2010) for Malawi and Lourenço Jr et al. (2010) for Zambia. This is based on the legal statutes that govern immovable property. 13 For the purpose of this study, the key point to note is that all of the proxies used in constructing property rights are broadly defined, 14 while the focus of this study is specifically on the right to own immovable property and the qualities of these rights.
(ii) Political Rights and Civil Liberties Indicators 10 See North (1991) for a general discussion. 11 See North (1990 North ( , 1991 and North & Thomas (1973) . 12 By 2006, Tanzania was rated 79 of 141, with a score of 6.5. 13 The concept of property rights is based on the Honore's definition of 'full liberal ownership' as adopted by Waldron (1988) . 14 Except for work by Fedderke et al. (2001) and Gwenhamo et al. (2008) .
While the property rights indicators experience some deficiencies, recent developments in political economy have quantified political institutions. Despite the availability of several empirical measures of political institutions, there is however no universal agreement among scholars on the ways of empirically measuring political freedom or political democracy. Among the indices are quantitative measures of political rights and civil liberties produced by Freedom House on an annual basis since 1972, for almost 165 countries. The political rights measure looks at a number of issues that allow for degree of political competition and permit people to choose their leaders freely. The civil liberties measure on the other hand considers measures of the rule of law and judiciary independence. Each right is scaled from 1 (free) to 7 (not free).
Another data set is the Polity IV database popularised by the work of Gurr (1975) and Jaggers and Gurr (1995) . The main variables captured are institutionalised democracy, which signals the existence of institutions or procedures through which citizens can express their political preferences meaningfully, and the institutionalised autocracy index, which signals an autocratic state in which competitive political participation is suppressed or prohibited. These data are available for few independent states for the period 1800-2007. 15 Most countries are included in the sample upon attainment of independence status.
The Database of Political Institutions (DPI) compiled by the Development Research Group of the World Bank is among the latest developments on political indicators. Beck et al. (2001) present the database and demonstrate its use. The database covers around 177 countries for the period 1975-2006 16 and it contains a variety of variables mainly measuring aspects of the political system and electoral rules. The major categories are the chief executive variable, looking at years in office, the chief executive's party affiliation; electoral rules looking at the type of the voting system and whether or not elections are affected by fraud. Others are measures of the political party fractionalisation index, indices of checks and balances and federalism.
(iii) Judicial Independence Indicators
This is the least-considered indicator compared to the previously discussed indicators. This is partly due to the difficulties of measuring and defining the concept. A couple of researchers have published several criteria or variables the judiciary must meet, based on specific laws or procedures, to constitute judicial independence (La Feld and Voigt, 2003) , while others focus mainly on the concept of the rule of law (Kaufmann et al,2009 ) and courts' dispute-resolution mechanisms (Djankov et al., 2003) . The literature or measurements that focus on the number aspects of judicial institutions mostly agree that a truly independent judiciary has three main characteristics. First, there is clear separation of the judicial system from other branches of government. Second, the judicial system is impartial; i.e. the judicial decisions are not influenced by the judge's personal interest in the outcome of the case. This also includes the idea that judges are not selected primarily because of their views, but on merit. Lastly, judicial decisions, once rendered, are respected.
The work of La covered the power and reach of the judicial system for 71 countries in a single database in 2004. The measure of judicial independence is based on two factors: (i) whether judges of the highest courts have life tenure, and (2) whether judicial decisions are a source of law.
Closest to the current work is Feld and Voigt (2003) , which provided a de jure and de facto judiciary independence index that covered the 77 countries for the year 2000. The de jure indicator comprises twelve variables, including life tenure and appointment by professionals. The de facto indicator is composed of eight factors; including the average length of actual judicial services and how often laws relating to courts have been changed. These indicators are available cross-sectional only.
The work of Djankov et al. (2003) , on the other hand, focuses on measures of dispute resolution in courts. The study provided the legal origin and legal formalism index for 109 countries for the year 15 Data on Tanzania are available from 1961 to 2007. 16 Tanzania data are available from 1975 to 2006.   5 2000. The legal formalism index is made up of seven broad aspects, including the use of professional judges as opposed to lay judges and self-representation, and the need to make written as opposed to oral arguments at various stages of the process.
The rule-of-law dimension which constituted one of the components of the governance indicators compiled by the World Bank (Kaufman, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2005 , 2009 , and Kaufman, Kraay, & Zoido-Lobatón, 1999) is a perceptions-based indicator. This captures the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. This variable is available annually for 2002 to 2008, although data exist for 1996, 1998 and 2000.
It is clear from the above discussion that most of the available indicators either represent a snapshot at a point in time or are cross-sectional in nature, thus limiting their usefulness in singlecountry time-series empirical work.
(iv) Political Instability Indicators
Many different variables have been employed to reflect the concept of political instability in literature. While there have been several attempts to construct a single indicator, there is no universal agreement among scholars given the dimensionality embodied in the concept of political instability. Therefore, a number of data sets exist which provide many indicators that can be used as possible proxies of political instability. This includes among others the Banks (1971) CrossPolity-Time-series, which includes variables measuring civil protest (general strikes, riots and antigovernmental demonstrations), politically motivated aggression (guerrilla warfare, assassinations and purges) and political regime instability (coups d'état and revolutions). The data coverage for Tanzania starts from 1961.
The other source of political instability proxy data are major rating services such the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG henceforth), which covers political risk evaluations. The commonly used indicators are government instability, internal conflicts, external conflict, military in politics, religious tensions and ethnic tension. The indicators are available on an annual basis starting from 1984.
The Database of Political Institutions by Beck et al. (2001) also offers indicators that can be used as political instability proxies. These include indicators such as polarisation and tenure of the chief executive. The database covers around 177 countries for the period 1975-2006. 17 
A Framework for the Evaluation of Measurement of Institutions
Recent debates question the manner in which institutions are defined and measured. According to Glaeser et al. (2004) , the frequently used measures of institutions 18 do not abide by the definition of institutions as postulated by North (1990) . Glaeser et al. (2004) argued that most of these indices do not capture the formal constraints. Instead, these variables tend to measure outcomes. As such they do not meet the criterion of permanency that North refers to.
Similarly the work of Arndt and Oman (2006) , criticise the World Governance Indicators as developed by Kaufmann et al. (2003. Their arguments are that the World Governance indicators lack comparability over time. Kurtz and Shrank (2007) additionally express their concerns with regard to subjectivity in the construction of the World Governance Indicators. Their argument is that these indicators are perception-based measures of governance and highly correlated with each other.
As a way forward, the work of Voigt (2007: 23) makes a proposal on how to measure institutions empirically. According to Voigt (2007: 23) , the measures of institutions should be precise, objective and take into account de jure as well as de facto elements. By doing so, the definition of North (2006) is embraced. The current study aligns itself with this argument and attempts to limit the common outlined problems by constructing measures that are de jure in nature based on formal legislation. These allow for the assessment of the rules of the game, rather than outcome. To minimise the influences of the authors' biases, multivariate techniques are used to compile the overall index. 19 Separate de facto indicators are constructed using observable statistical data.
Methodology
The study employs techniques and methods that minimise problems as outlined in section 2.2.2 of this paper. Fedderke et al. (2001) argue that in order to avoid outcome-based measures and to develop measures in line with North's definition, detailed analysis of formal legislation ought to be used. This involves annual ratings of the status of rights based exclusively on formal legislation in constructing the de jure position in the evolution of property rights, political and civil liberties, and the judicial system. The application is to Tanzania during the period 1884-2008.
Technique and the Method
The construction of indices is much like mathematical or computational models. According to Nardo et al., (2005) , the robustness of any index depends as much on the craftsmanship of the modeller as on universally accepted scientific rules for encoding. The construction of indices generally involves four steps, i.e. the development of a theoretical framework; scaling and rating; weighting and aggregation; and verification (McGranahan et al., 1972) , steps which are applied in this paper.
Development of a clear theoretical framework
The first step in constructing the composite indicators is the development of a clear theoretical framework which provides the basis for the selection and combination of each sub-component into a meaningful composite measure. The following institutional indicators based on the accepted definitions are constructed for the period 1886-2008.
(i) Property Rights Indicators
Demsetz (1967) defines property rights as the liberty or permission to enjoy benefits of wealth while assuming the costs which the benefits entail. Our indicator is constructed with particular reference to immovable property. This covers all legislation passed that affects the issue of immovable property, with special reference to land rights in Tanzania.
The ideal set of property rights will comprise of the following seven incidents, based on Honore's definition of "full liberal ownership" as adopted by Waldron (1988) and used by Gwenhamo et al. (2008) .
1. Right to possess: The owner at his own discretion is allowed to posses and dispose of his property.
2. Right to use: An owner is allowed to use his/her property at his/her own discretion, without contradicting the law.
3. Right to manage: An owner is allowed to manage his/her property at his/her own discretion without interference -in case of leaseholds.
4. Right to capital: The right to use property in financial transactions, including as collateral. Also includes the freedom to use of property for sublet and rent to earn capital.
5. Right to security: Ownership is protected from expropriations and interference by others. 19 See the discussion in the next section on the techniques employed.
6. Incident of transmissibility: An owner can transfer the rights to a specific person. This includes the right to sell, or give away, or mortgage, or buy or inherit.
7. Liability to execution: An owner could be held liable for liabilities emanating from his property which injuriously affect others.
The understanding is that any interference with any of these bundles of rights may restrain the freedom that can be enjoyed from the property.
(ii) Political Freedom
This measure is composed of indicators of political rights and civil liberties based on theoretical dimensions of a contemporary liberal democracy advanced by Gurr and Jaggers (1995) . The political rights indicators are based on the degree to which individuals in a state have control over those who govern. The civil liberties indicator measures the rights of the individual, including freedom of expression, assembly, association and religion. The following key features are evaluated in accordance with the written laws:
1. Voting Rights/ Franchise: This refers to universal suffrage where the right to vote is not restricted by race, gender, belief, wealth or social status.
Freedom of Association:
The right of individuals who share similar interests to come together and form organisations that represent their interests and views.
3. Freedom of Assembly: These uphold the right to peaceful assembly and limit the use of force by authorities in controlling the assemblies.
Freedom of Expression:
The right to freedom of expression upholds the rights of all to express their views and opinions freely. This also includes media freedom.
Extension of Arbitrary Executive
Power: This deals with constitutional provisions that limit and exclude the use of discriminatory discretionary powers vested in the executive in the applications of laws.
6. Freedom of Movement: The right of movement and the right to reside in an area of choice within the territorial boundaries of the relevant polity.
7. Independence of the judiciary and Legislature: This relates separation of power between the executive, judicial and legislative branches of government.
8. Academic Freedom: The right to freely teach or learn without unreasonable interference from authority. This also encompasses the right to access any institution of education irrespective of race, gender, belief, wealth or social status.
9. Government Secrecy/ indemnity: Deals with the applications of laws that act to conceal information to the public.
10. Due process of law: Is based on the principle that the government must respect all of the legal rights that are owed to a person according to law. This calls for protection of individual persons from the state.
11. Freedom of religion: Freedom of belief and freedom of worship.
12. Others: is a residual category that captures all rights and freedom relating to political freedom that cannot be classified under any of the specific dimensions. One key right relates to labour repression which was quite important during the colonial period of Tanzania, and other African countries in general.
(iii) Judicial Independence
20
The judicial independence index reflects the independence enjoyed by legal enforcement institutions, here proxied by the judges, in passing their judgement (Feld et al., 2003) . It is important to recognise the differences between the independence of the judiciary and political freedom as measured in this study. The Political freedom index has to do with whether or not political and civil rights are guaranteed, while judicial independence is about ensuring that citizens of that country are treated fairly and political and civil rights are protected. The judiciary plays an oversight role to ensure liberal democracy. To achieve the oversight role, the judicial independence relies on the principle that judges must decide cases fairly and impartially, relying only on the facts and the law.
The conceptual framework for assessing judicial independence captures the dynamics that encourage or impede judicial independence. This framework consists of two parts. The first part focuses on the influence of the legal foundations as provided for in the legislation over the judicial system. This forms the de jure measure of the judicial system. Based on Feld et al., (2003) , these are summarised by five broad categories assessed to highlight the status of the de jure judicial independence. According to Booysen (2002) , scaling of indices entails the ordering of subcomponents/variables in some meaningful way. This entails the transformation of variables into ordinal scales. Accordingly, the scaling entails the reading of enacted legislation to translation into numbers. Relying on the scaling categories in Fedderke et al. (2001) as reference point, the conventional linear scaling transformation method 22 is applied. The composite indices are scaled from 0-100, with 100 representing an ideal state or type of rights being guaranteed under the respective composite index. In terms of the sub-components, the raw points are awarded using scales, which together aggregate to a hundred score. 23 This process entails some inter-subjective judgements.
(a) Property Rights Indicators
It is argued that property is a general term for the rules that govern people's access to and control of things like land, natural resources, the factors of production and also inventions and other intellectual products. These systems of rules are assumed to exist in any society to avoid conflict and ensure cooperation, production and exchange. The common property arrangements are common property and private property and thus form the core of this study. Guided by the normative ideal criteria, the rating instrument is based on a list of seven incidences of rights as discussed in section 3.1.1.
The initial weights are derived from the work of Gwenhamo et al. (2008) . The right to possess are scaled from 0-20, the right to use, right to capital, right to security and right to transmit are scaled from 0-15. The right to manage and liability to execution are scaled from 0-10 (see table  1 ). Based on the weights, the following rating criteria are developed within the paper to guide the readers on the outcome of the rating the pieces of legislation.
Scores are awarded to various sub-components using varying scales. A lower score indicates an enactment of legislation that curtails the liberty or permission to enjoy the property, while the opposite is true for a higher score. Summing 24 across all incidences gives a total score of 100, representing an ideal set of property rights being guaranteed under the respective tenure index.
(b) Political Freedom
21 This is relevant for the construction of the de facto indicators due to the use of qualitative data. 22 This requires points of reference relative to which indicators can be scaled (Drewnoski, 1972) . A minimum and a maximum value are usually identified for each of the variables. 23 The sub-component weights are adopted from the work of Gwenhamo et al. (2008) , to maintain comparability in the datasets and these reflect the intersubjective judgements due to the independent verification by experts. 24 Factor analysis technique was used in obtaining the component weights contribution into the single composite indicator.
The rating instrument is based on the twelve key features covering both notions of political rights and civil liberties. Based on the work of Gwenhamo et al. (2008) , eight of the sub-components were scaled from 0-10, yielding a total of 80 raw points. This category includes voting rights, freedom of association, freedom of assembly, freedom of expression, the extent of arbitrary executive power, government secrecy or indemnity, due process of law and freedom of movement. 25 The other four categories were scaled from 0-5, and these include academic freedom, religious freedom, independence of the judiciary and the legislature 26 and a residual category. The following scaling matrix (see table 2), is compiled to guide the outcome of the rating instrument.
Raw points are awarded to the various sub-components based on scales, whereby an increase in the score indicates a move toward contemporary liberal democracy, and a decrease in the in the score indicates a move away from the ideal.
(c) Judicial Independence (de jure)
The rating instrument is based on five factors that serve as guiding principles in ensuring the formal (de jure) independence of the judiciary (see table 3 ). Due to the importance of both the high and lower courts in the countries under review, the five indicators were evaluated at both levels, thereby leading to ten sub-components. In this paper, these sub-components enjoy equal weighting of 10-point scale. Summing across all sub-components 27 gives a total score of 100, representing an ideal state of judicial independence.
(d) Judicial Independence (de facto)
This index relates to the de facto measure of the independence of the judiciary. The idea is to capture the quantitative information as reported through the variety of materials ranging from newspapers to political magazines as well as governmental and non-governmental reports. 28 Information on some sub-components is seldom available due to non-reporting of certain activities, particularly the sub-component judicial corruption. In order to standardise the sub-components, five scales are compiled in table 4.
(e) Political Instability Some episodes of instability have effects that are disproportionate to their fatalities. In order to standardise the variables, five scales for recording annual magnitudes for each variable are discussed in table 5.
Weighting and Aggregation of Index Components
The study relies on multivariate techniques by applying principal component analysis and factor analysis, which present an empirical and relatively more objective option for weight selection (Ram, 1982; Slottjie, 1991) . Principal component analysis is applied to the de facto indicators while the factor analysis is used in obtaining the components weights contribution into the single composite indicator for all de jure indicators. The two concepts are related but not identical.
In the principal components analysis, the components are weighted with the proportion of variance in the original set of variables explained by the first principal component of that particular 25 The freedom of movement is increased to a 10-point scale due to the importance of the right for Tanzania due to colonial history. 26 It should be noted that in the paper of Gwenhamo et al. (2008) , this sub-component was initially given a 10-point scale. The different treatment in this paper is to limit its influence on the specific indicator, to avoid a web of association with the judicial independence indicator. 27 The importance of certain components over others in the overall composite index was determined through the use of factor analysis to minimise the authors' biases. 28 The index is based on verifiable facts and not on subjective evaluations.
component. According to Ram (1982) , the technique has the advantage of determining the set of weights that explains the largest variation in the original component. Factor analysis assigns the largest weights to the indicators that have the largest variation, independently of prior views on their economic importance. These properties are particularly desirable in order to minimise the inherent subjectivity in the construction of indicators. In this way, the authors' biases are kept to a minimum.
Checking of Robustness and Validity of the Composite Indices
Composite indices also need to be validated. The common used measure of validity is the use of statistical correlation with other such measures 29 . The study will rely on the Spearman's rank correlation coefficient, which is appropriate for ordinal measures.
Data Sources
The data used to construct the de jure institutional measures relies mainly on primary sources. Detailed pieces of legislation with regard to land, political rights and civil liberties were obtained from the Colonial Gazette and Statutes of Tanzania. This was mainly obtained from the National Libraries and National Archives and cover mainly the period of colonial authority. For the post-independence period, pieces of legislations are obtainable from the Tanzanian Parliamentary database.
The construction of de facto indicators, i.e. political instability and independence of judiciary, relied on archival materials ranging from newspapers to political magazines. The other sources of such information include human rights groups and NGO reports in Tanzania.
Anticipated Caveats
The study recognises a number of caveats that are inherent in long-period studies such as this one, particularly when it involves the development of composite indicators and data gathering.
Coherence and continuity: The period under review is characterised by major changes such as changes in colonial powers, World War I and II and a protracted period of socialism for Tanzania. The manner how rights are conceived and defined has changed considerably over the period under review. This underscores the issues of conformity in the interpretation of historical meaning of different rights.
The Nature of the Institutional Framework in Tanzania 1884-2008
This section discusses the interpretation of property rights, political freedoms and political instability indices for Tanzania for the period 1884-2008.
Property Rights in Tanzania
The nature of property rights that evolved over a number of years in Tanzania is an outcome of the land tenure system implemented during both German and British colonial times, and modified after independence by the socialist government and again by the new democratic government in 1992. This led to four distinct major transformations in the land tenure system as identified in the subsequent paragraphs (see James, 1971; Fimbo, 1992; Kironde 2004 ):
1. The introduction and promotion of plantation agriculture under German administration introduced the formal distinction between the freehold tenure and non-freehold land system in the country. Prime agricultural land was generally allocated in freehold titles, to white settlers. All arable land which was at the disposal of the chiefs or indigenous communities was vested in the German Empire and could be alienated by the Governor.
2. The system of all arable land holding continued to change under the British Administration, whereby all rights over land were placed under the control of the Governor. The rights of occupancy were introduced in the country and in 1928 it was re-defined to include the rights of black African in land holding. 
Outcomes of rating
Due to the distinct time periods that characterised the history of Tanzania, a single property rights indicator would not reflect the differences in rights enjoyed by different holders. The evaluation of the security of rights over property was undertaken separately for the two different tenure systems, i.e. the freehold tenure system and the customary or non-freehold tenure system. An attempt was made to construct a single indicator using a multivariate technique. 30 The discussion begins with the evaluation of the freehold and non-freehold tenure systems, before focusing on the single composite indicator of property rights in Tanzania. Figures 1 and 2 present the sub-components of the freehold tenure system and customary or non-freehold tenure system, respectively. Tanzania   31 The distinction between the qualities of rights in freehold against non-freehold tenure systems was introduced as early as 1895, through the introduction of formal laws regulating land rights in Tanzania. The passing of the Imperial Decree regarding Creation, Acquisition and Conveyance of Crown land in 1895 recognised the conveyance of ownership or lease through issued title deeds for settlers, while the proof of ownership for blacks was recognised through effective occupation. Black Africans therefore were defined to have occupational rights on the land.
Freehold versus Non-freehold tenure system in
The period between 1903 and 1915 witnessed a noticeable improvement in both tenure indices (see figure 3 ). This was due to the Imperial Ordinance of 1902 and Land Registration Ordinance of 1903, which formalised land registries for whites and blacks respectively. It should be noted, however, that registration of land for black Tanzanians was only permissible as long as it was located within the boundaries of the communities or villages. The period between 1917 and 1920 marked a decline in the status of the property rights index in the freehold tenure system, as all German-owned properties 30 In the case of Tanzania it is impossible to obtain figures based on racial groupings since 1960, due to the Census design. Therefore, the composite index is based on factor analysis. 31 The terms "customary tenure system" and "non-freehold tenure system" are used interchangeably in this study. The improved status of rights under the freehold tenure system continued in the 1950s under the British Administration, while a systematic decline in the non-freehold tenure was observed. The enactment of the Land Registration Ordinance no. 36 of 1953 strengthened the rights under freehold tenure system. The act made special provision for all granted rights to be registered, including former German titles of absolute ownership. This act repealed and replaced all earlier ordinances. However, all forms of ownership held dating back to the German period were recognised. On the other hand, the application of the National Parks Ordinance of 1959 weakened the rights under the non-freehold tenure system. The ordinance made provision to extinguish customary land rights formally in all areas declared to be national parks.
With independence in 1961, the Socialist government made land ownership and control its major pre-occupation. This resulted in a major deterioration in both the security of rights in the nonfreehold and freehold tenure systems. The period between 1963 and 1974, served a major blow to rights under the freehold tenure system, while heavy attacks on non-freehold rights was witnessed between 1973 and 1992.
In 1963 The non-freehold tenure system however, continued to be attacked as the Government enacted bylaws to extinguish customary land rights in certain parts of Tanzania in 1986 (see figure 3) . These by-laws continued to be extended to other parts between 1987 and 1989. The biggest blow to the status of properties held under the non-freehold tenure system came in 1992, when the Government sought to extinguish customary tenure under the Land Tenure (Established Villages) Act no.22 of 1992. This was however ruled unconstitutional and removed in 1994 from the statute book by the Court of Appeal of Tanzania.
Furthermore, improvements in both indices are also noticeable in 1999 with the new Land Act no.4 and the Village Act no.5 of 1999, which repealed the Land Ordinance of 1923 and other colonial laws. The new Land Act makes provision for increased security of tenure, increased possibilities of disposition such as inheritance, selling and sub-leasing.
Interpretations of the Property Rights Index
Factor analysis was used to obtain a single indicator of property rights. The technique placed a 51 percent weight contribution on freehold tenure, while the customary tenure system accounts for 49 percent in the single composite (see figure 4) . This is expected, given that most laws passed affected the two systems equally with special reference to the period after independence in 1961. The analysis is based on the composite property index, which represents the nature of the property rights framework for the rest of the study, as plotted in figure 4 .
Changes in the property rights index are observed as early as 1891, with the passing of the land acquisition imperial ordinance of 1891, which proclaimed that the colonial government had the right to own all un-owned land within the German spheres of interest in German East Africa. This was reinforced in legislation, through the Crown Land Ordinance of 1894, which declared that all land in German East Africa was un-owned, unless proof of documentation could be presented. In the case of blacks, proof of ownership could be shown through effective occupation.
The period 1903-1915, witnessed a slight improvement in the institutional framework due to changes in laws that allowed land registration for whites through the Imperial Ordinance of 1902 and the Land Registration Ordinance of 1903. However, the commencement of World War I led to a decline of the property rights index as freehold title rights belonging to German nationals were deemed enemy property and renounced in favour of the Custodian of Enemy Property according to Proclamation no.5 of 1917.
The period 1923-1960 saw an improvement in the status of the property rights index. Of particular interest was the introduction of the right of occupancy system in Tanganyika. The Land (Amendment) Ordinance no.7 of 1928 formalised the customary land rights, which were defined as a right to use and occupy land. Improvements were observed in 1946 and the period 1953-1960, due to the declaration of the trusteeship agreement and the introduction of a number of land registries ordinances respectively (see figure 4) . The initial period after independence in 1961 saw the adoption of most colonial laws with the substitution of the word "President" for the word "Governor" in the application of Land Ordinance of 1923 and its amendment in 1928. Therefore, the power of granting land became vested in the President of the United Republic of Tanzania.
The year 1963 marks the start of deterioration in the status of property rights, a trend that lasted for almost 16 years (see figure 4) . This was realised through the introduction of the Arusha declaration and the subsequent nationalisation policies that were enacted during the period 1967-1983. This resulted in severe declines in formal ownership rights under the freehold tenure system as well as massive loss of customary land rights in favour of the Ujamaa Villages or government communal villages. The 1970s were arguably the most significant period of deterioration in the formal structure of the property rights index due to an attack on both the freehold tenure and customary tenure system. Improvements in the status of property rights were witnessed with the amendment of the 1977 Constitution in 1984, with the introduction of the Bills of Rights, which guaranteed for the first time in the history of Tanzania the right to possess and the protection of acquired property in accordance with the law. Furthermore, improvements are also noticeable in 1999 with the new Land Act no.4 and the Village Act no.5 of 1999, which repealed the Land Ordinance of 1923 and other colonial laws.
Political Freedom in Tanzania
The difference between the German and British administration can be classified into the nature of the system they had i.e. Native policy or direct rule versus Indirect rule (Austen, 1968). Before 1896, the German military administration was exercising a great deal of diplomacy by peacefully negotiating with black Africans. The period 1896-1906 introduced a forced change on black Africans' traditional structures. The Germans exercised their authority with disregard and contempt for existing local structures and traditions. The British Colonial Administration ruled indirectly through African leaders.
The post-independent political developments in Tanzania are characterised by three distinctive events, which affected political and economic institutional formation. First, there was a declaration of a one-party state in 1965, after multi-party elections prior to independence in 1961. Secondly, the departure from parliamentary supremacy to party supremacy in 1975 compromised the functioning of all other arms of government. Article 3 of the Interim Constitution amendment called for all political activities in Tanzania to be conducted by or under the auspices of the party. The final event is the transition to multiparty democracy in 1992, which witnessed the restoration of multiparty political democracy. Tanzania is among the very few countries at independence which had adopted a constitution with no bill of rights (Martin, 1974; Shivji, 1990 ).
Outcomes of rating
In assessing the quality of political freedom in Tanzania, the base is the period before 1884, in which customary law only was applicable. This is contrasted with the period of imperialism which followed, with codification and the application of German law to the territory from 1886 until 1920. Afterwards, the period that followed witnessed the application of common law under the British Foreign Jurisdiction Act, and lasted until 1961, when Tanzania gained its independence. Given the long period of coverage, the manner in which rights are conceived and defined change; hence the indicators should be treated with caution. Figure 5 plots the sub-components of the political freedom index. The figure shows how each of the 12 categories adds to the overall index. Figure 6 presents the composite political freedom index and is discussed next.
Interpretations of the Political Freedom Index
The presence of colonialism in Tanzania was introduced by the passing of the protectorate law of 1886. The stream of laws passed between 1895 and 1903, impinged on the fundamental political and civil rights of black Africans in the quest of consolidating a European elite base on the prevailing political and social structure in Tanzania. The electoral franchise and legislative functions were strictly limited to the Europeans (whites) through the provisions of the Governor's Council Ordinance of 1903 and the Native Jurisdiction Order of 1896. The Council Ordinance made provision for the establishment of an advisory body to the Governor and its composition was limited to the white community only. Minimal improvements in the quality of the political freedom index are noticeable between 1908 and 1913 (see figure 6 ). This is mainly on account of the Germany Tanganyika Memorandum, which recommended the review of the corporal punishment orders that paved the way for the passing of the Civil Procedure Code of 1908. The Code specified ways and procedures of conducting civil cases in an orderly manner.
The initial British occupation period saw enhancement in the formal structure of rights with the passing of the Whipping Regulation dated October 5, 1918. The Whipping Regulation made provision for corporal punishment to offenders exceeding 12 strokes to be approved by the lower courts rather than police officers. The application of the Criminal Procedure Code as applied in India in 1919, however, comprised due process of law and the independence of the judiciary, as the charges against the accused were not framed by the police until the magistrate had heard all the evidence for the prosecution.
The period 1921-1935 was characterised by a decline in the quality of the political freedom index, with the passing of stringent laws that stifled the political and civil rights of the majority of black Africans. Freedom of movement, association and due process of law were stifled during this period due to the enactment of legislation such as Destitute Person's Ordinance no.1 of 1923. The ordinance made provisions for the control of movement of unemployed blacks through imprisonment or deportation. Furthermore, due process of law was highly compromised with the passing of the Deportation Ordinance of 1921-cap38. The ordinance gave the Governor wide discretionary powers to deport a person from one point to another within the country to ensure peace and order.
Other The inception of independence in 1961 manifested slight improvements in the structure of formal political rights in Tanzania. The slight improvement followed the enactment of Education Ordinance no.37 of 1961, which repealed discrimination laws in the provision of education in Tanzania. The Local Government Elections (rural areas) Act of 1962 enhanced the enfranchisement of rural black Africans. The process of improvement in the formal structure of rights was not fully carried over as Tanzania adopted a constitution without a bill of rights. Laws that curtail personal freedom which were passed during the colonial era, therefore, were upheld and other new legislation mimicking the old laws were enacted, in case of repeals. The new laws included the Preventive Detective Act no.60 of 1962, which in greater extent was similar to the Deportation Ordinance of 1921, which was still applicable. The ordinance gave the President powers to arrest and indefinitely detain without bail any person considered dangerous to the public order or national security. More additional powers of detention were provided under the Regional Commissioners Act of 1962 and Area Commissioners Act no.18 of 1962. These acts permitted regional and district commissioners to arrest and detain for 48 hours, persons who might disturb public tranquillity.
Freedom of assembly and the right to organise which was enjoyed a few years before independence lasted only until 1964. The introduction of the National Union of Tanganyika Tanzania. 34 The enactment of the Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance Act no.7 of 2001, is another improvement in the formal political rights. In terms of the formal structure of political and civil freedoms (de jure), Tanzania is making progress in undoing restrictions on political freedom.
Judicial Independence in Tanzania
Different traditional judicial institutions for administrating justice existed prior to the colonial era (Court of Appeal of Tanzania, 2004) . These differed from one society to another, depending mainly on whether the society was centralised. Centralised and non-centralised societies differed in the way they ran their judicial institutions. However, despite these differences, both types of societies applied procedures 35 characterised by mediation, conciliation, arbitration and compromise. The start of the German colonial period in 1884 marked the beginning of the disintegration of the traditional judicial institutions and their replacement by an adversarial system of dispute settlement. With the introduction of imperialism, the traditional legal system began to weaken, thereby establishing ground for the functioning of the imposed German colonial legal system. The British mandate of 1919 entrenched a colonial state in Tanzania by imposing British laws received directly from England and those adopted from India. During the colonial period, three forms of institutions were created, i.e., organised colonial government; appointment of chiefs as local leaders and the creation of regular courts headed by salaried magistrates. At independence, most of the imposed and imported foreign laws, institutions and procedures were retained and many others were created (Seidman, 1969; Peter, 1997; Shivji, 2004 ).
Outcomes of rating
It should be noted for the purpose of the de jure indicators, that the study relied on formal structural guarantees of independence of the judiciary as specified in the law, without ascertaining the degree of judicial independence de facto. 36 It is irrelevant to this indicator whether or not interference took place or not. Due to colonial history in Tanzania, the construction of a realistic measure of judiciary independence should encompass both consideration of the Higher and Lower courts, as the majority of black Africans had access only to Lower Courts. The resulting index is combined using factor analysis. Figure 7 plots the sub-components of the de jure judicial independence index. The figure shows how each of the 10 categories adds to the overall index. Figure 8 presents the composite de jure judicial index and it is discussed next.
Interpretations of the Judicial Independence Index
The German East Africa Company which governed the protectorate from 1884 to 1890 had no ability to set up administrative machinery different from the local conditions on the ground. Notable changes are observable as from 1891 (see figure 8) , when German colonial government took direct administration of German East Africa. The German Ordinance of 1891 established two types of courts: District Courts and the Superior Court, both of which had jurisdiction over Europeans and applied pure German laws. The ordinance did not address the law and procedures in matters involving black Africans. The decree of the Chancellor of State regarding the exercise of Criminal Jurisdiction and Disciplinary Powers over the Natives, dated 22 April 1896, confined the exercise of justice to local administrative authorities. The combination of the executive and judicial functions meant that the majority were condemned to executive justice in which impartiality and fair play could not be guaranteed.
Impartiality for black Africans improved slightly with the passing of the Decree of the Governor no.105 of 1906, with regard to the Administration of Criminal Jurisdiction over Natives. The decree made improvements in the administration of corporal punishment and repeal rules regarding the implementation of corporal punishment dated 1 June 1896 (see figure 8) . This improvement was short lived, as the adoption of the Republic Constitution in 1962 conferred the power to appoint all judges in the High Court to the President. According to the provision of the Constitution, the judges who were non-citizens were to serve on contract. The appointments of judges by the President were reinforced in the Interim Constitution Act no.43 of 1965. 38 The year 1963, however, marked a major improvement in the Lower Court with the passing of the Magistrates' Act of 1963, which created a single hierarchy of courts based on a three-tier system. This Act abolished race as a test for jurisdiction of courts. Section 29 of the Act barred the appearance of legal or paralegal professionals before a Primary Court, as these courts were presided over by people with no formal legal training.
The adoption of the Interim Constitution Amendment Act no.8 of 1975 compromises the working of the judicial system. According to the amendment act all functions of the State, including the judiciary, were to be performed under the auspices of the party. This gave party supremacy over all other organs of the state. The adoption of the Union Constitution in 1977 marked minimal improvements in the formal structure of the judiciary. According to the Constitution of 1977, the President appoints the Chief Justices and other judges of the High Court after consultation with the Judicial Service Commission. Security of tenure was also strengthened, as the office of a judge could not be abolished and a judge could be removed from office only for inability to perform the functions of the office and on recommendation from tribunal investigation.
Improvements in the formal structure of judicial independence are noticeable in 1979 39 due to the passing of the Union Constitution Amendment Act No. 14 of 1979. The Act made provision for the establishment of a Court of Appeal of Tanzania. 40 This changed the court administration that existed since 1961, as the overall administration was now vested in the Court of Appeal. Noticeable improvements in judicial independence are witnessed in 1984 with the adoption of the Bill of Rights Constitution, vide Act no.16 of 1984. This improved the impartiality and accountability of the judges under the adversarial system. On the other hand, the passing of Basic Rights and Duties Enforcement Act No.33 of 1994, which deals with hearings related to constitutional, human rights and civil rights issues, might be viewed to compromise the impartiality of the High Court as the quorum provision caused delays in many cases.
The last decade marked some improvements aimed at reforming the administration of justice and strengthening judicial independence in Tanzania. The Pensions (Additional Retirement Benefits to Specified Public Officers) Order of 1996 gave judges and justices of appeal several rights on their retirement which improved impartiality among judges to dispense justice without fear. This was similarly reinforced in 1999 with the passing of the Public Service Retirement Benefits Act, 1999, which provides a new package for judges of the High Court of Tanzania, Justices of Appeal and the Chief Justice. The adoption of the Commercial Court Act of 1999 was observed as another improvement in access to court by the business community. The Act provides for judicial resolution of business disputes in the country.
The year 2000 marked significant improvements in the formal structure of judicial independence with the adoption of the 13 th Amendment to the Constitution, which eventually entrenched the independence of the judiciary (see figure 8) . According to Article 107B of the Constitution, all courts of law in the performance of their work of dispensing justice, shall be independent and shall only be required to follow the Constitution and the laws of the country. Tanzania is making major strides in ensuring the institutional framework of judicial independence. Major accomplishment are noticeable in the High Court and Court of Appeal, while leaving the other levels of the judiciary, which feed into these higher sections of the judiciary, still in disarray. The issue of appointment procedures including tenure and remuneration, as well as adequate facilities, remain a stumbling block in the lower courts.
Judicial Independence (de facto) 4.4.1 Conceptual Framework
The conceptual framework for assessing judicial independence is capturing the dynamics that encourage or impede factual judicial independence. The judiciary plays an oversight role to ensure liberal democracy. To achieve the oversight role, the judicial independence relies on the principle that judges must decide cases fairly and impartially, relying only on the facts and the law.
To assess de facto judicial independence, five sub-components have been used. Each of the five sub-components were standardised to take on values between 0-4, where a greater value in this instance indicates a constraint of the degree of judicial independence. The index is constructed by applying the method of principal component analysis.
Interpretations of the Judicial Independence (de facto) Index
41
The lack of protection and oversight role by the judiciary during the colonial period might be interpreted in this case as an independent efficient judicial system. Their integrity, however, was compromised as they were viewed by the majority of the citizen as another tool of oppression.
In the post-independence period, similarities unfortunately persisted in a different form. The dominant power of the executive persisted, as marked by high episodes of contempt of court cases between the late 1960 and early 1980s (see figure 9) . The substantial power of the President during this period hampered proper functioning of the judiciary. Furthermore, poor funding and poor training of judicial officials led to widespread judicial corruption. Although earlier data on this component are hard to come by, the period from the year 2000 onwards, witness a serious crackdown on corrupt judicial officials.
Political Instability Index
The lack of unified political institutions among African rulers during the pre-colonial era caused a situation of political tension amongst these units. In-fighting over territorial dominion continued throughout until the arrival of colonial powers. This marked a shift in focus towards a new threat posed by the presence of colonial powers (Kimambo, 1969; Duignan, 1977 43 In the period between the 1920s and the 1940s, Tanzania enjoyed relative stability, while rebellious activities were brewing underground. This culminated in the wave of workers' resistance between 1940 and 1955.
The post-independent period is marked by two major factors contributing to increased political instability during the period 1967-1983. First, the lack of a bill of rights in the Constitution and the formation of a single-party system gave the state the power to detain and harass more people who opposed the party authority. Second, the enactment of the Preventative Detention Act in 1962, gave the state powers to detain people even if the security of the state was not at risk. This included a variety of cases in the process of the implementation of the Ujamaa Collective farms project during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Social problems such as cattle rustling incidences in 1967 were solved through detentions and deportation laws on orders from the President. It should be noted that mainland Tanzania had remained relatively stable since 1985. However, political violence was experienced in the semi-autonomous island of Zanzibar and Pemba during the 1990s.
Comparative Analysis
In this section, two types of comparative analyses are undertaken. First, we compare the newly constructed indicators with other measures widely used in the literature. The second comparison focuses on the evolution of three countries' 44 formal institutional frameworks. The analysis seeks to disclose how historical associations among these countries have changed over time. A comparison is made between Tanzania and Namibia. 45 This is motivated by the fact that these countries shared a close alignment of the initial legal frameworks under the German regime. The analysis is then extended further to Tanzania and Zimbabwe 46 to get insight on the formal institutional frameworks under the British colonial regime. Table 6 shows the non-parametric Spearman correlation coefficients for the new series of formal institutional indices and the widely used indicators of political freedoms and property rights in Tanzania. The sign of the spearman correlation coefficient (r) indicates the direction between variables. The value of the coefficient varies between -1 and +1; with r = 1 indicating a perfect positive correlation, r = -1 indicating a perfect negative correlation and r = 0 indicating no correlation between the variables concerned. As the values moves towards 0, the relationship between the variables will be weaker.
Comparison of new indices
Tanzania Formal Institutional Framework
The correlation between the constructed property rights index (TZ-prop) and the Heritage Foundation property index (Prop-HR) is -0.73 and statistically significant at the 1% level. The correlation with the Fraser Institute property rights index (Prop-Fr) is weak and insignificant with a coefficient of 0.25. A general observation is that the Fraser Institute index is available for Tanzania from 1980 and is very volatile, while the actual passing of land legislation was not so frequent. These again come to demonstrate the differences between the de jure and de facto institutional measures.
The political freedom index is compared to the Freedom House indices of political freedom and civil liberties. The newly constructed Political Freedom index (TZ-Polfree) is strongly correlated with Freedom House political freedom (Polfree-FH) and Freedom House civil liberties (Civil-FH), with correlation coefficients of -0.84 and -0.90 respectively, and both statistically significant at the 1% level. The negative sign between these indices is due to inverted scale.
When comparing the new indices, there is a low and insignificant correlation of 0.08 and 0.17 between the property rights index with the political freedom index and the judicial independence index (TZ-JI-de jure) respectively. This confirms the differences in the forms of rights. The correlation between the property rights index and political instability is -.0.40 and statistically significant. The judicial independence and political freedom bond well with a significant correlation of 0.62, while there is weak relationship between political freedom and political instability, with a correlation of 0.23.
Evolution of formal institutional framework
Namibia and Tanzania
Figures 11; 12 and 13 depict the status of property rights; political freedom and judicial independence de jure indices between Namibia and Tanzania respectively.
(i) Property Rights Index
The status of property rights in Tanzania fared comparatively better than in Namibia from the early 1900s to the early 1960s. There are two possible explanations for this. The first relates to the type of economic activities that were undertaken in these countries. The second relates to German responses to wars that took place in the 1900s.
A majority of the Tanzanian population practiced crop cultivation and proof of ownership for blacks could be shown through effective occupation. Namibia, in particular the central and southern part which experienced a great deal of western influence, was occupied by pastoral and semi-pastoral communities for whom proof of ownership was difficult. Secondly, after the period of the internal wars, the German colonial power issued various pieces of legislation to expropriate land in Namibia, thereby causing an irreversible deterioration in the status of property rights in Namibia.
Tanzania ratings started deteriorating in the mid-1960s under the new socialist government, as individual ownership was virtually extinguished. The only improvements came after 1984 and 1999 with the introduction of the new laws which addressed the issues surrounding bills of right and customary land rights respectively.
(ii) Political Freedom Indices With regard to political freedoms, the two countries seem to be more at par. However the extreme harsh laws, i.e. the pass law and the contract law of 1907 in Namibia, compromise Namibian freedoms severely. Generally, under the period of colonialism, political freedoms were equally stifled in the two countries. The improvement in Tanzania in 1961 was quite short lived as the situation reversed, with the declaration of the one-party state under the post-colonial government.
In Namibia, the deteriorating trend could be ascribed to the application of the apartheid doctrine in the late 1940s. However, since independence in 1990, political freedoms are legally better respected than in Tanzania.
(iii) Judicial Independence de jure Indices
The judicial independence framework statuses of the two countries appear to be at parity both under the German colonisation period and the respective British and South Africa regime for Tanzania and Namibia.
Since the 1960s, with Tanzania gaining independence, a divergence is noticeable, but is not carried out in full. This is due partly to the notion of supremacy of the party over the arms of government. Namibia experienced strong improvements in 1990 with the adoption of the Constitution, which enshrined the independence of the judiciary. Figures 14 and 15 show the status of property rights and political freedom indices for Tanzania and Zimbabwe. The property rights status in Tanzania appeared to have been better than in Zimbabwe under the British colonial rule, given that laws such as the Land Ordinance of 1928 accorded the status of deemed right of occupancy. The year 1945 also coincides with the declaration of trusteeship agreement for Tanzania under the United Nations mandate. Since the 1960s, however, the rating for Tanzania deteriorated significantly until the late 1990s. The situation has since changed as the two countries have traded position, due to land reform process in Zimbabwe. 47 On the political freedoms front, it appears that the two countries were more or less at par with a notable deviation only registered in the 1980s, with the attainment of independence in Zimbabwe. Despite the independence of Tanzania in 1961, political freedoms continued to be stifled under the socialist government until 1984, with the adoption of a bills of rights in the Constitution of 1977.
Tanzania and Zimbabwe
Conclusion
The key argument of this paper is that measures of institutions are time truncated in the existing literature. This renders it difficult to explain the persistence of differences in income levels across countries. The paper argues that longer-dated series of institutional measures are vital, and it therefore presents formal measures on Tanzania The cross-country comparisons between Tanzania and Namibia reveal a comparable pattern in political freedoms and judicial independence indices, both under the German colonial administration and, subsequently, with the British colonial administration over Tanzania and the South African colonial administration over Namibia. The property rights patterns, however, remain divergent between the two countries under German colonial rule. The comparison between the British former colonies, i.e. Tanzania and Zimbabwe, shows a similar close pattern in terms of political freedom, while property rights appear to be better in Tanzania than Zimbabwe between 1945 and 1960.
Another feature of the study, covering this longer period, underscores the notion of persistence in institutions. The paper argues that despite changes in colonial regimes, the broader framework of institutions remained partly the same. This is reflected in the post-independence period in Tanzania, where the title of the president was substituting the governor titles in some land laws. Similarly, draconian laws similar to the colonial laws were enacted to curtail political freedom. 47 See Gwenhamo et al. (2008) for a detailed discussion. 
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Tables
88-100
Constitutional separation of powers; Professional appointments of some judicial officers.
8-9 75-87
Separation between arms of government and fewer restrictions on the judiciary contained in laws or Constitutions.
6-7 51-74
Some degree of separation with some procedural and substantial restrictions on the judiciary embedded within the laws / Constitutions.
4-5 38-50
Limited separations between arms of government; No clear appointment procedures.
2-3 13-37
Lack of separations between arms of government; no proper function courts; lack of judicial professionals 0-1 0-12
Source: authors' breakdown 
Subcomponents
Scaling Criteria Annual number of political fatalities including genocides 0 = less than 100 fatalities ; 1 = 100 -1000 fatalities ; 2 = 1000 to 5000 fatalities ; 3 = 5 000 to 10 000 fatalities ; 4 = more than 10 000 fatalities Annual number of politically motivated arrest 0 = less than 10 arrest; 1 = 10 -25 arrest ; 2 = 25 to 50 arrest ; 3 = 50 to 100 arrest ; 4 = more than 100 arrest Township strikes and riots (number of demonstrators involved) 0 = less than 100 demonstrators; 1 = 100 -500 demonstrators ; 2 = 500 to 1000 demonstrators; 3 = 1000 to 5000 demonstrators; 4 = more than 5 000 demonstrators; Number of political parties and publications banned per year 0 = None ; 1 = 1 -2 parties or publications ; 2 = 3 to 4 parties or publications; 3 = 5 to 6 parties or publications ; 4 = more than 6 parties or publications Number of declarations and renewals of state of emergencies per year 0 = None ; 1 = 1 -2 times ; 2 = 3 to 4 times ; 3 = 5 to 6 times; 4 = more than 6 times Source: authors' breakdown 1900 1904 1908 1912 1916 1920 1924 1928 1932 1936 1940 1944 1948 1952 1956 1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 1900 1904 1908 1912 1916 1920 1924 1928 1932 1936 1940 1944 1948 1952 1956 1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 1900 1904 1908 1912 1916 1920 1924 1928 1932 1936 1940 1944 1948 1952 1956 1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 1900 1904 1908 1912 1916 1920 1924 1928 1932 1936 1940 1944 1948 1952 1956 1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 
